It turns out, it's not just legislatures that can create Frankenstein's monsters of law. Sadly, the very institution we rely on to protect us from the excesses of the Legislature's mad scientist - the Ken Mars to our Gene Wilder, if you will - frequently cackles at us and flips the switch itself. And boy hidey, if I could swing Teri Garr into the bed that flew up to the roof, I'd probably do some crazy things too.
But, that's not the point. In re: Banks, in 1978, the North Carolina Supreme Court considered a challenge to the state's "Peeping Tom" statute, which reads:"N.C.G.S. 14-202: Secretly peeping into room occupied by female person. Any person who shall peep secretly into any room occupied by a female person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined or imprisoned in the discretion of the court." I'll let you take a second to ponder this.
So, Mr. Banks offers two arguments for the unconstitutionality of the statute: he argues first that it is unconstitutionally vague, and second that it is overbroad. Under the vagueness standard, Mr. Banks argues that the statute's plain meaning prohibits conduct it could not possibly be meant to prohibit - e.g., looking in a restaurant window to see if your friend has arrived yet. If there's a woman inside, and she doesn't know you're looking - WHOOPS! you just committed a crime - and a rather bad one, if you're hoping for a career in politics, since you're now a "Peeping Tom." In other words, Banks argues that there's no fair notice to the defendant based on his analysis that admits of obviously innocent conduct to be prohibited. He also argues that there's no enforcement standard, because of the same analysis. On overbreadth, Banks essentially makes the same argument as on vagueness - only he doesn't have to jump through any additional hoops. Because the statute bans clearly innocent conduct, it is unconstitutional on overbreadth.
The Court laughs him off the stage. They tell him not to be silly. The basic analysis of both Banks' arguments turns on the lack of a workable definition for two terms: "peep" and "secretly." The Court basically tells Banks that the Court can define those words however they want, and cite cases where the Court issued definitions that narrow the statute. The most egregious example of this is their redefinition of "secretly." The Court redefines "secretly" to mean "with wrongful intent to invade a privacy interest." Now, I want you to parse through the word "secretly" as close as you can, and tell me where that definition comes from. Thus, on vagueness, the Court redefines "secretly," then asserts that based on this redefinition that there is both fair notice and enforcement standards (since the prosecutor now has to prove "wrongful intent"), and on overbreadth, well, CLEARLY the redefinition makes it not overly broad, since you can only be convicted if you've done something WRONG, right?
Technically, the Court can do this. Narrowing the construction of a statute is perfectly within the Court's power, although I would argue that this particular narrowing is an unconscionable abuse of discretion. But why didn't Banks appeal to the federal courts on, oh, I dunno, equal protection? The statute only permits prosecution if a FEMALE person is in the room. Needless to say, I don't think a federal court would have permitted this statute to stand.
As a matter of fact, I think the federal courts would have laughed the State off the stage. After all, no matter how impressive it is that the monster can scream "Puttin' On The Ritz," it doesn't matter until you manage the brain transplant to calm him down.